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Causing Economic Harm to Property Developers -  
Damages for Starting an Incurably Bad Appeal? 
 
 
A recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal involved an unusual 
statement of claim made on behalf of the developer of a proposed resort in Port 
Douglas.  The decision is The Beach Club Port Douglas Pty Ltd v Page [2005] 
QCA 475. 
 
The issue 
 
The defendant had objected to a development application of the plaintiff 
developer and lodged an appeal in the Planning and Environment Court against 
the council decision granting a development permit.  The main issue in the 
Planning and Environment Court was whether the site coverage of the proposed 
resort was excessive. 
 
In a separate action (the subject matter of the present appeal), the plaintiff 
developer claimed damages for ‘negligence’ alleging that the defendant had 
breached a duty of care not to appeal without properly or reasonably assessing 
whether the development qualified for a permit given that the resort qualified for 
the maximum allowable site coverage.  It was alleged that the appeal lodged by 
the defendant in the Planning and Environment Court had no reasonable 
prospects of success and that any reasonable person properly advised would 
know, or ought reasonably to have known, that to be so.  The defendant had 
been “put on notice” that the plaintiff would incur loss of $10,000 for every day 
there was a delay in starting construction of the resort. 
 
The claim made by the developer required the court to consider those 
circumstances where a person may lawfully and deliberately cause economic 
harm to another.  Was a duty of care owed by the defendant for negligent 
conduct of litigation that caused economic loss to the plaintiff? 
 
Background 
 
It was alleged that the the defendant had previously informed the plaintiff 
developer that one of the vendors of the land in question was “so miserable that 
he would not give anyone the steam off his shower” and “in the past … had done 
the wrong thing by the defendant” and that the defendant was pleased to be able 
to hold up the project knowing that it would cost that vendor money.  Further, the 
defendant was concerned that the plaintiff’s proposed resort development was 
going to affect the defendant’s business. 
 
At first instance, Muir J made an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. 
 
On appeal, separate judgments were delivered. 
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McPherson JA 
 
Having reviewed relevant English, Australian and Canadian decisions, 
McPherson JA concluded that, apart from remedies conferred by statute or by 
the common law in the form of malicious prosecution or collateral abuse of 
process, no duty of care in negligence was owed by one litigant or his or her 
solicitor for the negligent conduct of litigation that causes loss. 
 
McPherson JA was satisfied that there was no occasion or justification for looking 
beyond the allegations in the statement of claim in which it was distinctly averred, 
that the defendant, as a reasonable person, ought to have known that the appeal 
was “hopeless, untenable and bound to fail” and had “no reasonable prospect of 
success”.  Flowing from this allegation, McPherson JA opined: 
 
 If that was indeed so, then the plaintiff could and should have taken steps to strike out the 
 appeal.  In that respect the plaintiff’s remedy lay in the procedural rules of the court in 
 which the defendant embroiled it and not in a distinct action for breach of an alleged duty 
 of care.  At [20] 
 
McPherson JA went on to observe that the defendant, in appealing, might be 
seen as simply protecting his business interests for as long as possible against 
unwelcome competition.  Provided he had not inflicted financial harm by adopting 
unlawful or conspiratorial means, the decision in Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 
suggested that the defendant may do so without incurring civil liability in 
damages to the plaintiff. 
 
Jerrard JA 
 
In relation to the plaintiff’s assertion that a duty was owed not to start an 
incurably bad appeal in the Planning and Environment Court, Jerrard JA noted 
that these circumstances give a respondent in a Planning and Environment Court 
appeal a right to apply for an order striking out or dismissing such an incurably 
bad appeal, with costs.  The availability of this right made it difficult for the 
plaintiff to sustain the allegation that it was “vulnerable” and otherwise unable to 
protect its interests. 
 
In addition, Jerrard JA opined that public policy considerations strongly favoured 
having only the Planning and Environment Court, and not another court in 
separate proceedings, rule on whether an appeal to the Planning and 
Environment Court lacked all merit, and if so what the consequences were for the 
parties to that appeal.  Jerrard JA also noted how difficult it is for another court to 
make this type of judgment, on different evidence and argument, and why public 
policy should discourage re-litigation of concluded proceedings via negligence 
claims.  
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Chesterman J 
 
Chesterman J agreed with the reasons given by McPherson JA and Jerrard JA. 
 
Result 
 
The result in this matter may possibly have been different if the property 
developer’s statement of claim had been based on some cause of action other 
than negligence.  As alluded to by McPherson JA, a cause of action, such as 
collateral abuse of process could be found to exist although to succeed in such a 
claim it would be necessary to show that the appeal proceedings in the Planning 
and Environment Court were instituted with an improper motive.  For this reason, 
although the plaintiff’s statement of claim was struck out, leave was granted to 
deliver a further statement of claim within a specified time. 
 
 
 
BD 
